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Abstract 
 
This paper develops three basic arguments about the evolving role of cabinets – the 
personal offices of European Commissioners – in the work of the Commission.  First, 
however much their roles may have changed, any cabinet is only as strong as the 
Commissioner it serves.  Second, cabinets have become a bridge between long-time 
member states and new, inexperienced, post-2004 entrants.  Third, the cabinet system 
helps ‘rescue’ the Commission from several barely imaginable fates.  One is the one it 
would face if there existed no channel by which national EU capitals could truly 
influence and shape the work of the Commission.   
 
 
 
The  European  Commission  has  always  been  a  hybrid  administration.    From  its 
origins, it has always been deeply involved in both policy advocacy and management.  
But controversy about its basic purpose has never abated over its 50 year lifespan.  
Should the Commission be an administration de mission, which charts new directions 
and projects in European integration?  Or simply an administration de gestion, which 
simply  manages  the  policy  agenda  collectively  chosen  for  the  EU  by  its  member 
states?  The Commission under the Presidency of José Manuel Barroso has, as ever, 
sought to be both.  But its approaches to these tasks have, arguably, been distinctive.    
Its  mission  is  a  ‘Europe  of  results’,  especially  in  policy  areas  visible  to  ordinary 
Europeans.  Equally, it is committed to ‘better regulation’, not least through more 
effective management (gestion) of the policy-making process.   
Against this backdrop, the role of the private offices – or cabinets – of the 
‘enlarged’ College of European Commissioners under Barroso is investigated in this 
paper.  It develops three basic arguments.  First, however much their roles may have 
changed, the idea that any cabinet is only as strong as the Commissioner it serves is a 
timeless principle of life in the Commission.  Second, the cabinets have taken on the 
role of a bridge between long-time member states and new, inexperienced, post-2004 
entrants.  Third, and most generally, whatever the pathologies of the cabinet system, it   2 
helps ‘rescue’ the Commission from several barely imaginable fates, above all that 
which it would face if there existed no channel by which national EU capitals could 
truly influence and shape the work of the Commission.   
Here,  we  connect  to  the  recent  and  counterintuitive  argument  that  the 
Commission and other supranational EU institutions enhance the legitimacy of its 
member states.  They do so not least by helping them to devise and enforce solutions 
to  transboundary  policy  problems.    Just  as  (generally)  ‘supranationalism  enhances 
national  legitimacy  in  functional,  political,  and  administrative  terms’  (Menon  and 
Weatherill 2008: 398), the power of cabinets (more specifically) in the Commission 
helps ensure that nationalism enhances supranational legitimacy in all of the same 
terms.   
 
1.  Cabinets:  the Animals Nobody Loves 
It is difficult to find anyone in the academy of EU scholars who has much that is 
positive to say about cabinets, which consist of 6-7 personal advisors to individual 
Commissioners.
1  One of the most memorable denunciations is that of McDonald 
(1997: 51) who, not satisfied with labelling them a ‘structural contradiction’, goes on 
to claim: 
 
They  readily  recruit  people  directly  from  national  contexts,  bypassing  the 
services, and they have regular contacts with national administrations, national 
lobbyists  and  the  permanent  representations.    They  also  notoriously 
‘parachute’ their chosen national recruits directly into key service jobs, over 
the heads of well-qualified and experienced officials in the services.
2 
 
Stevens  and  Stevens  (2001)  note  that  the  Commission’s  first  President,  Walter 
Hallstein, was wary of the very idea of cabinets.  In their view, it was ‘with good 
reason as it turned out’, since cabinets have been associated with a variety of ills 
including ‘favouritism and nepotism’ and ‘fragmentation and conflict’ (Stevens and 
Stevens 2001: 201-7). 
  Cabinets  are  probably  even  more  vilified  in  the  Commission’s  permanent 
services,  or  Directorates-General  (DG).    They  are  widely  viewed  as  being 
disrespectful both of the work of the services and the Commission’s independence.  
Cabinets  are  a  barrier  to  the  Commission’s  mission  to  identify  and  pursue  the 
overarching ‘European interest’ (as opposed to those of its member states).  One of 
the present author’s most memorable interview sound-bites ever came from a Dutch 
official in the Commission’s Secretariat-General (which manages the Commission’s 
services) who complained that ‘intergovernmentalism starts when proposals hit the 
cabinets.  They are mini-Councils within the Commission’ (Peterson and Bomberg 
1999: 39).  Ross’ (1995: 161) kiss and tell memoir of his time inside the cabinet of 
President Jacques Delors accused some cabinets of becoming ‘shadow cabinets’ for 
the national administrations of individual Commissioners, and some cabinet members 
– especially younger ones – of completely revamping the work sent to them by the 
services ‘just for the fun of it’. 
                                                 
1 Under the Presidency of Romano Prodi (1999-2004), cabinets were reduced in size from (as many as) 
9 to 6 officials, with Prodi himself retaining 9 in his own cabinet.  Barroso also appears to have 9 
‘members’ in his cabinet, but also 4 officials listed as ‘advisers’ (including a ‘senior’ and ‘principal’ 
advisor).  See http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/team/index_en.htm (accessed 24 April 
2009).   
2 On the role of cabinets in parachutage, see (Stevens and Stevens 2001): 84-9.   3 
  The  cabinets  were  singled  out  for  attack  by  the  1999  Committee  of 
Independent Experts, whose report triggered the mass resignation of the Commission 
under the Jacques Santer Presidency.  Cabinets were saddled with much of the blame 
for  the  Commission’s  ‘distant,  needlessly  hierarchical  and  bureaucratic  approach’ 
(quoted in Stevens and Stevens 2001: 237).  Even the popular (but mostly unknown 
and pretty ghastly) 1997 film, The Commissioner, starring John Hurt and based on a 
book  by  Stanley  Johnson  (father  of  Boris  and  former  Director-General  of  DG 
Environment), gets in on the cabinet-bashing.  The head (or ‘chef’) of Hurt’s cabinet 
as  Industry  Commissioner  turns  out  to  be  part  of  a  web  of  intrigue  involving  a 
chemical  firm  with  possible  Nazi  links  that  is  found  to  be  manufacturing  and 
marketing chemical and biological weapons.  In short, cabinets recall the title of a 
1980s  children’s  television  programme:    they  are,  along  with  wildebeests  and 
warthogs, the animals that nobody loves. 
  But there is no doubt they are often highly political animals.  In the past, many 
were hand-picked by governments in national capitals.  While their backgrounds have 
always varied, more have been drawn from posts in national political parties, civil 
services,  trades  unions,  or  the  private  sector  –  as  opposed  to  the  Commission’s 
services – than would be viewed as appropriate by many in Brussels circles.  For 
every past Commissioner that has made a point of recruiting mostly from the DGs, 
such as Neil Kinnock, it is possible to find another – such as Edith Cresson – who 
brought nearly all of their team to Brussels from their national capital. 
    There is evidence of considerable change at the cabinet level in the years 
since  the  Santer  Commission  resigned.    Under  the  Commission  Presidency  of 
Romano Prodi (1999-2004), all Commissioners were required to appoint a chef or 
deputy chef of a nationality other than the Commissioner’s own.  Cabinets were also 
reduced in size (to 6 from as many as 9 previously).  They also were placed, along 
with their Commissioners, physically in the same buildings as the services for which 
their  Commissioner  was  responsible.    The  latter  move  was  described  by  Spence 
(2006: 72) as a ‘more than symbolic gesture at reform, and overall it led to the cabinet 
system becoming even more central to the process of Commission policy formation’.   
  The actual effects of these changes were debatable but certainly mixed.  All 
cabinets in Prodi’s Commission had officials of at least three nationalities, a major 
change from the past when Commissioners were only required to appoint one non-
national  (who  was  often  a  marginal  figure  within  a  cabinet).    Lots  of  new  faces 
appeared:  around two-thirds of cabinet officials had no previous cabinet experience 
and around 40 per cent were women, which both marked major increases on past 
totals.  Cabinets became more like ministers’ private offices since Commissioners 
became more like ministers, based physically at ‘their’ ministries (DGs).  There was 
some evidence, although limited and anecdotal, of somewhat less disharmony and 
even what might be termed single-mindedness between some cabinets and services.   
But few in the Commission were prepared to argue that cabinets – smaller, 
more ‘European’, and closer to the services - had become any less of a line of direct 
input  from  national  capitals.    In  particular,  there  was  no  indication  that  cabinets 
(including,  pointedly,  that  of  Prodi)  intervened  any  less  aggressively  in  personnel 
decisions (see Peterson 2004).  Any trend towards greater ministerialism that may 
have arisen from the basing of Commissioners in the services was reversed when their 
offices were reconsolidated in the central Berlaymont building after it reopened at the 
beginning of the Barroso Presidency in 2004.     4 
  Less  than  a  year  later,  the  new  (British)  Trade  Commissioner,  Peter 
Mandelson,  made  what  has  become  something  of  an  iconic  statement  about  the 
shifting balance of power between the two halves of the hybrid: 
 
...since the glory days of Delors, the Commission has not been led from the top  
down…my guess is that power within the Commission has inexorably shifted to 
the services.  Indeed I believe that through the shocks of the Santer resignation 
and  the  subsequent  upheavals,  it  was  the  Directors  General  who  kept  the 
Commission show on the road….The consequence has been a loss of cutting edge 
in policy and a reluctance to make hard choices instead of endless compromises.
3 
 
Mandelson could be accused of rushing to judgment, and incidentally airing a highly 
inflammatory view, after being in post for less than a year.  However, there seems 
little doubt that his view was much influenced by his vastly-experienced chef, Simon 
Fraser, who had served in Sir Leon Brittan’s cabinet during the Delors years, when 
the  rivalry  between  Brittan  and  Delors’  cabinet  was  the  stuff  of  legend  (Spence 
2006b: 64-5).  In any event, one thoughtful observer of the Commission, with the 
advantage  of  an  insider’s  perspective,  observed  (around  the  same  time)  ‘an 
indubitable  trend  for  civil  servants  not  to  accept  or  at  best  to  openly  doubt  the 
authority of cabinets to supervise or monitor them’ (Spence 2006: 70). 
  Regardless of Barroso’s own view, he made it clear that he was determined to 
take Prodi’s reforms of the cabinets several steps further.  He decreed that all cabinets 
under his Presidency would include officials of three nationalities, a chef or deputy 
chef with a nationality different from that of the Commissioner, and should reflect a 
‘reasonable’  gender  balance.    Perhaps  most  importantly,  Barroso  required  that  all 
Commissioners select at least 3 members of their cabinets from the Commission’s 
services, meaning that only slightly more than half of all cabinet officials were some 
kind of ‘import’.  One effect was to change radically the constellation of nationalities 
at the top of cabinets.  For example, 4 (of an initial 25) chefs and 2 deputy chefs were 
German, almost all of whom were young officials with previous services in the DGs.  
Meanwhile, only one chef and two deputy chefs were French (Spence 2006: 72). 
  Writing  from  the  perspective  of  over  a  decade  ago,  Donelley  and  Ritchie 
(1997: 50), the former another former member of Brittan’s cabinet, predicted ‘it is 
likely  that  cabinets  will  continue  to  grow  in  size  and  importance’.    If  the  first 
prediction proved false, due to Presidential engineering, the latter remains debatable.  
However, whether cabinets have ‘grown in importance’ becomes a particularly acute 
question for a College that has now ballooned to 27 members and which includes 
Commissioners from new member states with relatively little experience of Brussels.  
Perhaps  naturally,  EU-12  Commissioners  (that  is,  those  from  states  that  joined  in 
2004-7) have disproportionately recruited officials who are not of their nationality, are 
old Commission hands, and hail from one of the EU-15 member states that were 
already in the Union prior to 2004 (see section 3 below).  A question inside the acute 
question is:   can a strong cabinet compensate for a weak Commissioner (or vice 
versa)?  
                                                 
3  Peter  Mandelson,  ‘The  Idea  of  Europe:    can  we  make  it  live  again?’,  speech  to  the  University 
Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES, Crown Plaza Hotel, Brussels, 20 July 2005, 
available  from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_articles/sppm045_en.htm.     5 
 
2.  The (Wo)Man Makes the Cabinet?  Or the Cabinet Makes the (Wo)Man? 
Spence’s (2006a) edited tome on the Commission, now in its 3
rd edition and nearly 
600 pages long, probably tells all but the most committed Commission watcher more 
than  they  really  need  or  wish  to  know  about  the  institution.    Spence’s  own 
contributions to the book are invariably lively, opinionated and spiced with inside 
dope.    Yet,  the  question  of  whether  any  cabinet  is  only  as  strong  as  their 
Commissioner is one on which he is unusually hesitant and, apparently, of two minds.  
His long chapter on ‘the President, College and the cabinets’ returns to the question 
repeatedly, but never resolves it: 
 
A good cabinet can boost the standing of an otherwise poor Commissioner, and a 
poor  cabinet  can  compromise  an  otherwise  good  Commissioner.    So,  it  is  no 
coincidence that the most effective Commissioners have traditionally been those 
with the best-staffed and best-organised cabinets…While the cabinets can to some 
extent  counterbalance  a  Commissioner’s  shortcomings  and  are  used  by 
Commissioners to strengthen their own performances in areas where they might 
otherwise  be  weak,  in  practice  it  is  very  difficult  for  advisers  to  manage  the 
successes and failures of policy-makers in the services (Spence 2006b: 60-8). 
 
  Most other scholarship on the Commission tends to skirt the question.  An 
exception, however, is Donelley and Ritchie’s (1997: 46) clear declaration that ‘the 
effectiveness  of  the  cabinet  ultimately  depends  on  the  effectiveness  of  their 
Commissioner’.  There is considerably more evidence to sustain this claim than there 
is  to  suggest  the  a  well-run  and  organised  cabinet  can  ‘boost  the  standing  of  an 
otherwise poor Commissioner’. 
  To be precise, it is probably safe to conclude that an effective cabinet is a 
necessary, but itself insufficient condition for a Commissioner to be effective.  The 
classic case of a strong Commissioner with a strong cabinet entirely dominating the 
College is that of Delors himself (see Grant 1994; Ross 1995).  Delors’ cabinet was 
headed by a formidably able chef, Pascal Lamy, who later became a powerful Trade 
Commissioner under Prodi.  Delors’ office ran an almost parallel ‘government’ within 
the Commission by creating and working via a network of trusted operatives in the 
services (see Stevens with Stevens 2001: 237-9).   
But the Delors case illustrates the wider point with even more alacrity when 
we consider how powerful, forceful, and (by some accounts) ideological Brittan’s 
cabinet was over much of the same period:  that is more than a decade of Sir Leon’s 
tenure as Commission Vice-President.  Besides those already mentioned, Brittan’s 
cabinet  included  leading  lights  such  as  Jim  Curry  (later  Director-General  for 
Environment and Head of the Commission’s Delegation in Washington DC), Robert 
Madelin (later Director-General for Health and Consumer Protection), David Wright 
(later of Santer’s cabinet and Director in DG Market), and – perhaps above all – 
Catherine  Day  (later  Director-General  for  Environment  and  presently  Secretary-
General of the Commission).   Insiders in  cabinet discussions, and indeed College 
debates, reported that many internal negotiations within the College resembled ‘tennis 
matches’ between the Delors and Brittan camps, with all others around the table often 
sidelined and watching silently.
4   
                                                 
4 In the first Delors Commission (1985-9), much the same was said about the dominance – and polar 
opposite ideologies – of Delors and Irish Commissioner for Competition, Peter Sutherland and their 
respective cabinets.     6 
By the same token, multiple examples can be cited of talented Commissioners 
who were let down by their shambolic cabinets.  One example is Frans Andriessen, a 
former Dutch Finance Minister who served for three consecutive terms as (mainly) 
Commissioner  for  External  Affairs  and  two  as  Vice-President  from  1981-93.  
Officials in the Commission’s external services during this period often bemoaned the 
conflicting or entirely non-existent signals they received from Andriessen’s office, 
which  was  viewed  as  exacerbating  the  Commission’s  marginalisation  (after  1992) 
from the nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  In contrast, the main 
factor  behind  Chris  Patten’s  generally  favourable  record  as  External  Relations 
Commissioner under Prodi (besides his cooperative relationship with Javier Solana), 
in his own mind, was that his cabinet consisted (mainly) of ‘the best that Britain’s 
Foreign Office and Treasury could have provided’ (quoted in Spence 2006: 63). 
  Moreover,  there  is  a  flip  side  to  the  ‘strong  Commissioners  have  strong 
cabinets’  corollary.    A  Commissioner  who  is  out  of  their  depth  or  has  trouble 
establishing a productive relationship with ‘their’ service makes their problems far 
worse  when  they  fail  to  observe  the  accepted  rules  of  propriety  for  assembling  a 
cabinet.  Arguably, the current case of Gunter Verheugen illustrates the point.  By 
most accounts, Verheugen – a foreign policy specialist - had both grip and credibility 
as Commissioner for enlargement under Prodi, and did much to pilot the ‘big bang’ 
enlargement  of  2004  to  a  successful  conclusion.    However,  Verheugen  frequently 
seemed  out  of  his  depth  as  Commissioner  for  Enterprise  under  Barroso.    The 
ferocious attack he launched on the Commission’s services (see Wille 2007) seemed, 
in part, designed to distract attention from the cause célèbre that emerged when he 
was photographed on an apparently romantic holiday with a long-time associate who 
he had recently promoted to chef of his cabinet.
5   
  In short, and inevitably, the question of whether Commissioners determine 
their cabinet’s credibility more than cabinets determine their Commissioner’s remains 
debatable.  But it is certainly a burning question, as the next section makes clear, for a 
radically enlarged Commission.  On balance, the evidence points to the Commissioner 
making the cabinet, more than the cabinet making the Commissioner. 
 
3.  The Cabinets After Enlargement 
Gauging whether cabinets have ‘grown in importance’ under the Barroso Commission 
is complicated by significant shift of the ground on which the Commission stands.  
One major shift, of course, has been in the direction of administrative reform of the 
Commission (Kassim 2004; Bauer 2007).  It is difficult to assess with any precision 
how much the post-2000 reforms have affected the position and role of the cabinets 
and how.  By one view, the effect of more European and less ‘nationalised’ cabinets 
under Barroso (as well as Prodi), with more officials drawn from the DGs, working 
with services that are better-run and managed as a consequence of the reforms, should 
be less disharmony and a Commission that produces more professional proposals and 
analysis.  The cabinets, by this view, would finally be emerging as an effective hinge 
between the political and administrative halves of the hybrid.  By a more cynical 
view, the services might be viewed as so busy with reporting and the goobledygook of 
Unit  Management  Plans,  the  Integrated  Resource  Management  System,  Activity-
Based  Budgeting,  Activity-Based  Management,  and  the  like  that  they  were  easily 
dominated by the cabinets (Peterson 2004: 26). 
                                                 
5 For a fulsome exposition of this rather sad story, see Der Spiegel International On-line, ‘Political 
scandal  hits  the  EU’,  23  October  2006  (available  from: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,444308,00.html).     7 
Of  course,  enlargement  produced  an  even  more  dramatic  shift.    For  the 
Commission, as for the other EU institutions, it was a major earthquake that shook the 
terrain  on  which  the  administration  is  constituted.    The  Commission  is  now  a 
considerably different institution to what it was before 2004.  The swelling of the 
EU’s membership by no less than 80 per cent has left a mark on the Commission in 
three basic respects (Peterson 2008a; Peterson and Birdsall 2008).  First, and perhaps 
most importantly, for the first time the Commission is constituted like any offshoot of 
the  Council  of  Ministers,  with  one  Commissioner  per  member  state.    Naturally, 
questions  arise  about  whether  the  Commission  had  become  just  another 
intergovernmental  institution,  a  sort  of  COREPER  III  (Piris  1994),  whose 
independence and capacity for honest brokerage has been compromised. 
Second, and relatedly, the College is more dominated by its President.  In 
some  respects,  Prodi’s  had  been  a  more  Presidential  Commission  than  had  been 
Santer’s, even though Prodi himself was widely viewed as a weak and inept leader 
presiding over a College of (20 for most of his tenure) exceptionally able, forceful, 
and heavyweight Commissioners (see Peterson 2006).  But there is no question that 
Barroso has imposed his own authority on the Commission to a far greater extent than 
Prodi.  Most insiders concede that more Presidentialism is a simple necessity in a 
College of 27, even though collective responsibility of the entire College for all of its 
decisions becomes difficult to maintain.  Barroso himself hinted at his tendency to 
work  bilaterally  with  individual  Commissioners  in  claiming  that,  paradoxically, 
decision-making in a College of 27 was actually easier than before:  ‘if a member of 
the  Commission  comes  with  a  proposal  that  is  supported  by  the  President  of  the 
Commission, to find a strong majority that objects to it is very difficult’ (Peterson 
2008b: 68). 
Third, again relatedly, the Barroso Commission was an unusually technocratic 
and  faceless  Commission,  especially  compared  to  that  of  Prodi.    Paradoxically, 
multiple EU-12 states sent top members of their political classes to serve in Brussels:  
that is, former foreign, finance or even prime ministers (see Peterson 2006: 90-1).  
But one top official, with cabinet experience in several Commissions, explained that 
Barroso’s was ‘not a political Commission in part because an intermediate generation 
of  technocrats  dominated  the  first  post-Communist  political  classes  in  the  new 
member states.  One consequence is that there is not a lot of ideological debate in this 
Commission’.
6   
  Did that mean that cabinets were more or less powerful than in the past?  
One factor that complicated the equation was how finely-divided portfolios were in a 
College  of  27.    Some  cabinets  were  perhaps  more  powerful,  or  at  least  more 
constructively involved in the work of the services (in part) because fewer of their 
members were ‘imports’ from national capitals under Barroso.  But cabinets were 
certainly  not  very  powerful  where  the  Commission  had  little  competence  and  the 
services had little actual policy work to do.  The case of multilingualism illustrates the 
point:  it was handled by one official in Commissioner Jan Fígel’s cabinet prior to the 
admission of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU in 2007.  After that, in a sense an entire 
cabinet  was  constructed  to  handle  the  portfolio  under  the  new  (Romanian) 
Commissioner for multilingualism, Victor Orban.
7   
Did the disparity between weak and powerful Commissioners and cabinets 
reflect an EU-15 v. EU-12 divide?  Yes and no.  Most of the dossiers where the 
                                                 
6 Interview, 2 October 2007. 
7  Of  course,  Orban’s  cabinet  –  like  all  others  –  is  responsible  for  monitoring  all  dossiers  and  all 
activities of the Commission so as to maintain the principle of collective responsibility.   8 
Commission packed the most punch – trade, competition, justice and home affairs, 
and so on – all went to Commissioners from EU-15 member states.  But regional 
policy  was  allocated  to  the  Polish  Commissioner,  Danuta  Hübner.    The  former 
Estonian Prime Minister, Siim Kallas, was named a Vice-President and put in charge 
of administrative affairs.  More generally, the EU-12 Commissioners operated as a 
sort of ‘bloc’ within the College on only a few issues, such as free movement and 
recruitment of their nationals to the services.  It was notable that at the beginning of 
the Barroso Commission that chefs of EU-12 Commissioner cabinets met as a group, 
but did so less frequently as time went on. 
So, on balance, have the cabinets ‘grown in importance’ under Barroso?  Or 
not?  By most accounts, cabinets do what they always have done:  act as recipients of 
national and sectoral lobbying efforts, link Brussels with national capitals, coordinate 
policy, mediate between competing interests (not least within the services), and help 
maintain collegiality.  But they now play a new and vital function in an enlarged EU:  
they act as a bridge between newer and older member states.  Perhaps predictably, 
given rules on the nationalities of those holding senior cabinet posts, officials from 
EU-15 states accounted for over 90 per cent of all chefs de cabinet in the Barroso 
Commission.  They also held well over 80 per cent of deputy chef posts.   
It was more difficult to get a fix on the total composition of the cabinets in 
terms of national origins of members.  Again, Barroso’s requirement that all cabinets 
recruit at least 3 members from the services was a factor, since the services offered a 
much smaller pool of EU-12 officials from which to select.  But there was no question 
that  far  more  than  56  per  cent  (the  share  represented  by  15  of  27)  of  all  cabinet 
officials  hailed  from  EU-15  states.    The  cabinets  were  thus  functioning  as  an 
important forum for extending the EU’s habits of cooperation far further to the east 
and south of Brussels than ever could have been imagined when the Commission (and 
what became the EU) were created 50 years ago. 
 
4.  How Cabinets Rescue the Commission 
One prominent, recent analysis of the current state of European integration makes a 
fascinating and, in many respects, entirely counterintuitive argument (see Menon and 
Weatherill 2008).  While rather light on actual evidence, it illustrates the power of a 
single (sacreligious) idea:  in this case, the idea that has been developed by Milward 
(2000) that the EU ‘rescues’ the nation-state in Europe.  Specifically, in the historical 
case, its creation allowed discredited and weak nation-states to reassert their authority 
and competence in the  post-war period by making possible economic  growth that 
none would have been able to deliver in the absence of European institutions.  In the 
contemporary case, the argument becomes one about legitimacy (primarily), instead 
of authority or competence.  It is that ‘the claims to legitimacy made by the EU and its 
member  states  are  of  [a]  distinctive  character  but  independent  and  mutually 
reinforcing’ (Menon and Weatherill 2008: 397).   
  The effect is to turn the argument about the ‘democratic deficit’ on its head.  
Globalisation means that citizens expect their governments to deliver public goods of 
which they are incapable of delivering acting on their own:  economic growth, but 
also  acceptable  health  and  safety  standards  in  the  products  they  consume, 
environmental protection, rights to movement across borders, and so on.  EU states 
are  more  capable  of  delivering  such  goods  than  are  other  states  because  of  the 
existence  of  the  Union.    Since  the  EU  facilitates  such  delivery  despite  the  high 
volume of transboundary exchange in Europe, and crucially does not seek to replace 
the nation-state in Europe, it adds to the legitimacy of the state in Europe.  Put simply:    9 
‘[s]tates remain the ultimate sources of legitimacy in Europe.  The EU makes their 
claims more respectable’ (Menon and Weatherill 2008: 398).  Put another way, ‘the 
EU supplements its member states’ (Menon and Weatherill 2008: 403).  It is not their 
adversary,  despite  the  ‘credit-assignment  problem’  whereby  the  Union  is  often 
blamed by national governments for their failings, while governments hypocritically 
seek to take credit for the EU’s successes.  It is their friend. 
  In  much  the  same  way,  cabinets  supplement  the  Commission.    The 
Commission  is  a  uniquely  politicised  bureaucracy  that  illustrates  the  tensions  of 
European  governance  more  than,  arguably,  any  other  European  institution 
(Christiansen 1997).  The Commission is stuck between its need to be independent 
and pursue the collective European interest, and its need to be sensitive, and respond, 
to the narrow national interests of its member states, which have become far more 
diverse in an EU of 27.  Cabinets do the trick.  They are steadily becoming more 
European  and  less  captive  of  national  interests.    But  they  still  perform  the  time-
honoured  function  of  making  national  administrations  and  governments  feel 
ownership of the Commission.  Cabinets are thus the Commission’s friend. 
In several specific ways, cabinets ‘rescue’ the Commission.  One is they help 
obscure and keep from disrupting its work the Commission’s glaring and still unmet 
need for a system of junior Commissioners (Spence 2006), since much of the work 
done by cabinets is effectively that done by junior ministers in national governments 
(Brittan 2000: 5).  But a system of senior and junior Commissioners is unlikely to 
emerge, particularly given the arrival of a reduced, slimmed down Commission based 
on equal rotation between member states after 2014, as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty.  
There is zero chance of the creation of such a system of junior Commissioners in the 
absence of a forceful effort to create one by a Commission President, who would in 
any  event  face  powerful  opposition  by  numerous  member  governments  to  such  a 
configuration.   
Another way in which cabinets rescue the Commission is in terms of voting.  
When push comes to shove, the Commission decides by simple majority.  But it also 
works on the basis of collective responsibility.  If a vote is taken, and the margin is 
(say) 14-13 in a college of 27, all must publically support the majority view.  One of 
the truly timeless observations about the Commission is Coombes’ (1970) insistence 
that no one has ever shown what is meant to unite the College enough to allow us to 
expect  them  to  exercise  collective  responsibility:    they  share  no  party  political, 
ideological, national, or any other affiliation or identity (although some Colleges have 
clearly been united by a commitment to ‘building Europe’).   
In  practice,  few  measures  are  ever  put  to  a  vote  in  the  college.    None  (if 
Barroso  can  be  believed;  see  Peterson  2008b)  have  been  put  to  a  vote  under  his 
Presidency.  The cabinets are a crucial reason why.  They are responsible for the vast 
majority of ‘decisions’ taken by the college, which (in the case of non-contentious 
decisions)  are  taken  either  by  the  so-called  written  procedure  or  special  chefs 
meetings.  In the former case, cabinets receive copies of a proposal and are asked to 
raise any objections by a deadline after which the proposal is considered agreed in the 
absence of any.  Meanwhile special chefs bring together either policy-specialised or 
senior (especially chefs) members of cabinets.  In any given week, around 6 or 7 
special chefs meetings will be held.  Each, according to Spence (2006: 67), lasts for 
between 1 and 12 hours.   
We thus might well come to two conclusions about cabinets.  First, most of 
their  members  work  extremely  hard.    Nugent  (1999:  108)  offers  one  of  the  few 
positive assessments about cabinets in the EU literature by observing that ‘typically, a   10 
cabinet  member  is  a  dynamic,  extremely  hard-working,  30-40  year  old’.    Young, 
thrusting, and with no security of tenure, most cabinet members naturally are driven 
by a perceived need to serve and make an impression on their Commissioner, which is 
seldom a recipe  for inaction or non-intervention.   It is little wonder that they  are 
considered a special form of terrorist by many in the services.  But they are also an 
important cog in the Commission’s machinery for decision-making. 
Second, there could be no collective responsibility without the cabinets.  If we 
returned to the vision of the first Commission President, Walter Hallstein, who was 
determined to keep cabinets small (only a few members, as was the case for members 
of the High Commission of the original European Coal and Steel Community), then 
there would logically be far more cases where the College would be forced to vote.  
The College would thus risk ruptures and resignations (when members felt they could 
not  publically  support  a  College  decision)  far  more  often  than  it  does  under  the 
current system.  
Ultimately, the cabinets are the essential deal-makers within the Commission.  
They  ‘identify  key  interests  within  the  member  states  and  construct  deals  with 
Commission officials from DGs with divergent views’ (Spence 2006: 68).  They may 
be channels for national impulses, even interference, but probably increasingly less so 
as cabinets become less captive of seconded officials from national capitals and more 
diversely ‘European’.   In any case, the Commission clearly needs to know which 
amongst its proposals has a chance of being agreed, and how.  The cabinets provide 
the Commission with the political antennae to know what will fly on the Council that 
(for example) the European Parliament seems to lack.  Whatever perceived legitimacy 
the Commission has, returning to the Menon and Weatherill (2008) argument, it has 
largely because of the cabinet system. 
The cabinets rescue the Commission in a separate, albeit related, final, and 
crucially important way:  they allow the Commission to cope in a current period of 
transition characterised by vast disparities between its member states in terms of the 
resources and expertise they can deploy at the EU level.  It is hardly surprising that 
the cabinets of EU-12 Commissioners contain so many officials who are nationals of 
EU-15  member  states,  even  leaving  aside  Barroso’s  injunction  to  pull  in  more 
officials from the services and fewer from national capitals.  Again, there is little to 
suggest  that  a  weak  or  lazy  Commissioner  truly  can  compensate  for  their 
shortcomings  by  recruiting  an  able,  thrusting,  dynamic  cabinet.    But  having 
experienced advisors puts EU-12 Commissioners at less of a disadvantage in the cut 
and thrust of Brussels deal-making.  They also perform a sort of training function for 
officials from EU-12 national capitals who have been brought to Brussels to serve in 
cabinets.    In  short,  the  cabinets  are  clearly  helping  the  Commission  to  ‘manage’ 
enlargement. 
The portrait that we have painted of cabinets might well be thought to be over-
rosy.    If  cabinets  continue  to  wield  independent  power,  it  might  be  viewed  as 
incongruous  with  recent  reforms  of  the  Commission  designed  to  make  it  more 
accountable and performance-oriented.  Cabinets may be becoming more European, 
but they need to be made more accountable.  We might accept this verdict but also 
conclude that cabinets, for better or worse, are entirely consistent with the trend in 
national  administrations  towards  the  greater  use  of  relatively  independent, 
government-appointed  ‘policy  units’  that  oversee  and  even  direct  the  work  (often 
through unwelcome interference) of national ministries (see Barber 2007).  As such, 
cabinets make the Commission seem less anomalous, alien, and ‘foreign’ in the eyes 
of national governments and administrations.  It makes the Commission even seem   11 
‘normal’, in that it ‘embodies many of the organizational and behavioural patterns that 
are highly typical of executives as we know them from national settings’ (Egeberg 
2006: 196). 
 
 
Conclusion 
It might be claimed that we simply do not know very much about cabinets in the 
Commission.  We may still be stuck in Delors-era assumptions that are no longer 
accurate (if they ever were) about cabinets, or even the Commission more generally.  
Fortunately, our knowledge of the Commission may be about to expand by an order 
of  magnitude  thanks  to  the  largest-ever  independent  attitudinal  survey  of  the 
Commission (see table 1).   
 
 
TABLE 1 – EUCIQ
8 SURVEY SAMPLE COMPOSITION 
   
Sampling took place in late 2008 and produced a very large data set on around 
2200 officials (see table 1 below).  Predictably, cabinet members – who apparently 
                                                 
8  EUCIQ  is  an  acronym  for  the  ‘European  Commission  in  Question’  project,  which  is  funded  by 
Framework programme VI (through the EU-CONSENT network of excellence) and the UK Economic 
and Social Research Council.  The principal investigator is Hussein Kassim of the University of East 
Anglia.    See  http://www.pol.ed.ac.uk/eu_consent/commission_survey  and 
http://www.uea.ac.uk/psi/research/EUCIQ.   
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continue to have no shortage of things to do – responded far less often than other 
categories of Commission official.  But the sample size on cabinet members is larger 
than it looks because all respondents were asked to indicate their previous positions 
held.  One testable hypothesis is whether there are now more former cabinet officials 
still with the Commission but now working in its administration.  
However large or small the sample’s actual count of officials with cabinet 
experience,  there  is  rich  potential  for  generating  truly  new  knowledge  about  the 
Commission and cabinets.  In particular, we should find out the extent to which there 
are differences of view between cabinet officials and officials in the services on some 
of the most burning questions raised in this paper about how they work together (or 
not).  Examples include how well coordination works between the College (including 
cabinets)  and  the  services,  whether  cabinets  respect  the  technical  expertise  of  the 
services,  and  whether  they  are  too  preoccupied  by  developments  in  their 
Commissioner’s national capital. 
We have seen that members of Commission cabinets are amongst the least popular 
Eurocrats  both  in  the  EU  academic  literature  and  (especially)  the  Commission’s 
services.  We have considered whether they are becoming more or less powerful, 
while concluding that the Commissioner makes the cabinet far more than the cabinet 
makes the Commissioner.  The crucial role played by the cabinets in helping to bridge 
the  gap  between  newer  and  older  member  states  was  highlighted.    Finally,  we 
considered various ways in which the cabinets ‘rescue’ the Commission.  Here we 
should perhaps acknowledge that the Commission is a rather unloved institution in the 
aggregate  and  across  Europe.    The  point  is  that  the  cabinets  help  it  avoid  being 
positively loathed and actively resisted.   
After careful analysis of the role of cabinets in the Commission, what we may 
left with above all may be the need to rethink, or even redefine, what we mean by the 
most  frequently-used  terms  of  art  in  EU  studies:    ‘supranational’  and 
‘intergovernmental’  (Peterson  2008a).    Enlargement  means  that  the  Commission 
looks  more  like  the  Council.    It  may  be  less  autonomous  and  independent  of  its 
member states than in the past, but possibly also more integrated into the EU system, 
especially  if  we  understand  that  term  broadly  as  embedding  the  national  in  the 
supranational and vice versa (see Laffan et al. 2000).  The process of embedding EU-
12 national politics and administrations into the Brussels system obviously requires 
time, and the Commission is a vital arena for such embedding.  It becomes politically 
naïve in these circumstances to present as ‘fact’ the claim that ‘there is no intrinsic 
need for each Member State to have a Commissioner’ (Spence 2006b: 55).  Very few 
in EU-12 political classes would accept this view.  Most would insist that it is far 
more important for the Commission to be legitimate than efficient.  One important 
measure of its legitimacy is whether it has a member of the College who is of their 
nationality,  speaks  their  native  language,  and  can  appear  in  the  national  media  to 
explain what the EU is doing and why.   
Perhaps by 2014, when the Treaty change towards a smaller, more ‘European’ 
Commission kicks in, things will be different.  But perhaps not.  In any event, in these 
circumstances  the  fact  that  EU-12  Commissioners  are  able,  even  obliged  in  some 
respects, to appoint officials to their cabinets who do not share their nationality helps 
square a circle:  the College can retain (for now) one Commissioner per member state 
and remain an independent, European, ‘supranational’ institution.      13 
For  better  or  worse
9,  cabinets  help  legitimise  the  Commission  by  making 
governments feel as if they have their own operatives working within it, in positions 
of power and able to shape and mould its agenda.   Cabinets thus help rescue the 
Commission.  We might conclude that they give it space to have a mission, however 
compromised  by  conflicting  national  agendas,  as  opposed  to  just  being  just  an 
administration de gestio’.   
Alternatively, we might conclude that we are in a ‘post-vision era’, or one in 
which a radically enlarged Union focuses on pragmatic policy results more than new 
or dramatic acts of political integration.  In these circumstances, we might decide that 
Spence oversimplifies when, first, he accepts as relevant and contemporary the simple 
dichotomy  between  mission  and  gestion  that  seems  captive  of  bygone  days;  and, 
second, concludes that the Barroso Commission has become an administration de 
gestion tout court.  In part because the transition has been so smooth, it may be too 
easy to forget how recently and radically the EU has changed as a consequence of 
expanding its membership by 80 per cent in the space of a couple years.  Enlargement 
may be viewed as a true mission but that requires careful gestion.  The cabinets help 
provide it. 
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